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The Re-imagining of China under President Xi Jinping
HUGO de BURGH
University of Westminster
Abstract: This article explains how Xi Jinping is consolidating an identity for China, at home and abroad, which 
draws upon the country’s past more than upon its recent revolutionary history. In so doing, he appears to be 
acknowledging the desire of many, perhaps the majority, of Chinese people, to defend their culture against conversion; 
he is also providing an ideology to inspire the young and the servants of the state, offering an alternative to 
‘westernisation’ and, in effect, replacing the now discredited Marxism-Leninism of his predecessors. Rather than 
rejecting China’s past as they did, Xi speaks of a renaissance of it. The implications for international relations are 
substantial. The writer suggests that Westerners should welcome this, as the ideology is not missionary or universalist, 
but advances stability and respect for difference as fundamentals of its approach to the wider world.
[HUGO de BURGH. The Re-imagining of China under President Xi Jinping.  China Media Research 2018; 14(1): 
1-7]. 1
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Academics outside China who follow the activities 
of President Xi have been paying particular attention to 
the      exertion of discipline at home, and the restless 
energy with which he seeks to bind the development of 
other countries to China. Academics characterise the 
polity that China is thought to have become in very 
different ways, from Stein Ringer’s shocked 
denunciation of a ‘perfect dictatorship’ to Zhang 
Weiwei’s enthusiastic acclamation of a ‘consultative 
democracy’; Howard W. French and others interpret 
present strategy as aiming to restore the Empire as it was 
before the arrival of the barbarians. 1
Less discussed is a most pregnant development of 
the Xi years, the re-imagining of China. He is 
consolidating identity, with implications for both 
domestic governance and international relations. 
Xi Jinping’s predecessors tiptoed towards a revised 
ideology and the implicit acknowledgment that Marxism 
had limitations. ‘Mousecatching’ philosophy2 negated 
economic determinism; the Three Represents abolished 
class struggle; the Harmonious Society was a rejection of 
revolution. Renmin University’s Shi Yinhong informed 
us that, in Main Street, PRC,  Marxism-Leninism had 
1
 Ringen, Stein (2016) The Perfect Dictatorship: China in the 
21st Century HK: HKU Press introduction;  Zhang Weiwei. The 
China wave: rise of a civilizational state, Hackenstack, NJ: 
World Century Publishing; 2011; French, Howard 
W. 2017 Everything under the Heavens: How the Past Helps 
Shape China’s Push for Global Power New York: Knopf and 
Allison, Graham (2017) Destined for War: Can America and 
China Escape Thucydides’ Trap? Dublin: Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt
2
 ‘Mousecatching philosophy’ is the shorthand for Deng’s 
famous dictum that ideology is to be judged by efficacy, ‘it 
matters not whether a cat be black or yellow as long as it catch 
mice’.
been  jettisoned by the population as a whole (Shi, 2004, 
p228); the leaders could not but follow. What is to take 
its place?
Until 1949 Chinese were not confused about their 
identity, though often distressed by the failure to realise 
it and by the material superiority of the foreigners who 
clawed at the carcass of the Qing Dynasty and the 
struggling Republic. They still saw themselves as heirs, 
if temporarily on hard times,  of the greatest civilisation 
on earth and a society and polity based on principles that 
were superior to all others. Later they were embarrassed 
by the cruel idiocies of the Maoist period, even when they 
bought into Mao’s conceit that China had, only thanks to 
him, ‘stood up’. But confidence in China’s moral status 
and passionate adherence to the idea of China rarely 
faltered. 
A Confucian renaissance
Confucius is the symbol of that status. Abjured for 
thirty years after 1949, the sage has been edging his way 
back into public life ; some talk of ‘neo-Confucianism’ 
as modern media interpreters provide a sanitized version 
that attracts post-Marxism generations. Expositions of 
his philosophy abound in the media and the most 
successful was a series Learning from Confucius by Yu 
Dan, transmitted in 2006. Over 2014-2016 Gao Xiaosong, 
who broadcasts online with a reported 900m views, has 
had great success when he has been discussing topics 
relating to the Confucian tradition.
Even while he cites Mao Zedong for his spontaneity 
and patriotism, President Xi Jinping has joined in the 
rehabilitation of Mao’s bete noir, Confucius, his 
adherents and his ideas. Xi is the said to be the first 
Communist Party leader to give a speech in 
commemoration the sage and has visited his birthplace, 
with its great temple and many memorials, to say nothing 
China Media Research, 14(1), 2018                                                                         http://www.chinamediaresearch.net
http://www.chinamediaresearch.net                                    30                                       editor@chinamediaresearch.net
of the homes of descendants, to show respect.  He makes 
more references in his speeches to Confucian thinkers 
than to any other category. (Sun, 2014)
Under the Xi administration, senior government 
officials are obliged to take lectures on Confucianism, as 
part of their in-service training (Page, 2015)，  from 
academics who would once have been labelled 
reactionaries. Establishing or restoring temples 
honouring Confucius has become commonplace; so are 
recitals of Confucius’ Analects and many other related 
rituals. (Osnos, 2014)
Xi has converged ideas that in the past were 
associated with Communism, with those of the sages. In 
his view, not only does ‘socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’ have its origins not in western thought but 
ancient Chinese philosophy, but socialism is more or less 
a Chinese invention. A typical Xi quotation, at the 3rd 
Plenary of the 18th CPC Central Committee in 2013, 
came from the Analects (c400BC): ‘do not worry about 
poverty but instead over the unequal distribution of 
wealth’. (Zhang, 2015 p14)
The people must be listened to; indeed the mandate 
of heaven depends upon the rulers being in touch with the 
people. For this, Xi finds an aphorism from a philosopher 
of the Eastern Han Dynasty, Wang Chong:
‘The people living in a house know better if the house is 
leaking: the bottom of society knows better if a policy is 
improper. ’ (Zhang, 2015, p8)
Thus today’s ‘consultative democracy’, explained 
for us by luminaries such as conservatives Hu Angang 
and reformers He Baoguang, appears to be the modern 
name for ancient practice.
Xi regularly uses old saws to remind his audiences that 
‘the people hold the country together’ ,‘governance 
requires  the peoples’ support’ and ‘both civility and law 
are required to govern’.  (Xi, 2015)
Why?
There are multiple uses for this ‘return’, the first in 
foreign policy. The USA and the EU aggressively project 
themselves as models and leaders; decades of soft power 
projection have influenced foreign publics to give them 
the benefit of the doubt. China, as the principal trading 
partner of 124 countries, and with economic interests 
everywhere, wants to be viewed with the same benign or 
respectful eye. If seen as vessel of a discredited model – 
communism – it will have limited purchase; to be seen as 
a follower of the USA, trying to catch up, is unacceptable 
for a culture with its own norms and standards which its 
elite regard as equal, if not superior, to any. China is to 
be regarded as an alternative civilization.
Then there is cultural imperialism. Confucians and 
Marxists are as one in their revulsion against a society in 
which business is the principal power, and against 
individualism. This is how they see Anglophone society, 
which they do not admire, even if they respect American 
wealth or the Anglophone political achievement. Cultural 
globalization, which is seen as the diffusion of capitalist 
values under cover of universalism, is to be resisted. The 
fight to get UNESCO to pass, in 2005 and against strong 
US objections, its Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression was an 
illustration of that view.3 It is not just intellectuals who 
worry about this. According to Pew’s 2016 Global 
Attitudes Survey, 77% of Chinese believe that their way 
of life needs to be protected against foreign influences.  
Xi Jinping reflects these popular inclinations. His 
predecessors talked of going forward to modernity, 
discarding the past even if not utterly repudiating it. Xi 
speaks of renaissance, of a revival of the greatness 
disrupted by foreign imperialism. One of his advisers 
recently remarked that Xi wanted to stop teachers 
referring to ‘the Enlightenment’ as something that took 
place in 18th century Europe; ‘our Enlightenment took 
place in the Spring and Autumn period’ [771-476 BC], 
Xi is reported as saying. 4
President Xi responds to concern at the absence of a 
moral consensus. It is widely grumbled that the 
undermining of traditional norms by the revolution did 
not give rise to ‘socialist morality’ but simply to greed 
and crass selfishness plus the extreme corruption that is 
usual in Marxist societies, in which the main currency is 
political connection. In resurrecting Confucian moral 
values and tolerating the re-emergence of Buddhism,  the 
leaders are tackling the belief void. 5
Society at large has been ahead in this proceeding, 
as we see from schools, public exhortation, the media and 
cadre training.
Schools
Since the 90s the road to Shaolin Monastery, the 
shrine of martial arts, has been lined with schools, 
primary and secondary, in the vast courtyards of which 
hundreds of children exercise, wearing traditional 
costumes. This was one early example of parents seeking 
‘traditional’ schooling for their children. Today many 
millions of children are accessing the Canon of Chinese 
civilisation, and this may have much greater impact than 
the martial arts.
After the failed attempt at political revolution in the 
1980s, the enthusiasm of patriots and intellectuals 
3
 http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.pdf, 
Accessed 06 April, 2016 
4
 Kong Dan, head of the CITIC think tank, quoted to me 
by his associate, Professor Li Xiguang on 17 May 2017.
5
 For more on this, see Lim, BK and Blanchard, B ‘Xi 




98S0GS 20130929, Accessed 27 September, 2017
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focussed on cultural development, particularly guoxue, or 
the Canon. Gradually Marxism-Leninism came to be 
seen, except by the far left, as a foreign imposition of 
little relevance to China. Shi Yinhong, a leading light of 
Renmin University, a CCP foundation, put it thus:
‘…the most remarkable manifestation of civil 
society in China is found in the alienation of society from 
the state’s ideology, belief system, political culture, and 
“official discourse.” Political indoctrination courses and 
their examinations have long been viewed as repugnant 
by undergraduate and postgraduate students, who muddle 
through them with the least amount of effort. There is 
hardly any private subscription to the central and local 
Party newspapers, magazines and journals. The Chinese 
Communist Party’s propaganda-producing departments 
are viewed as the least prestigious party institutions by 
intellectuals. Political functionaries are regarded in most 
places as cadres possessing no specialized or professional 
skills who make their living with “empty talk”.’ (Shi, 
2004 p228)
The USA was admired for its material success but, 
especially after 2003, neither for its culture nor for its 
claims to moral leadership. Many who returned from 
study in the Anglosphere are reported to have taken back 
with them a heightened sense of the differences between 
the two cultures and advocated a return to roots (Westad, 
2015, p457).
In the 1990s small independent schools calling 
themselves Confucius Academies were inaugurated and 
the national press lauded them. 6 Later, members of 
Congress called for the establishment of schools for the 
study of the Chinese classics. 7 And there has been 
lobbying for the reversal of language reform, the 
restoration of full-form ideograms, to connect youngsters 
with the literary heritage and with the diaspora, often 
conceived of as having maintained true Chinese culture 
while it was being undermined in China itself. 
Today there are a great many academies8 but the 
main impact of the Canon is probably in the generality of 
schools in which guoxue classes have become a growing 
component. In 2014 the Ministry of Education required 
6
 In 1993 two articles were published in the leading national 
party newspapers, in effect ‘legalising’ the movement. The 
Peoples’ Daily published Guoxue quietly comes back to Peking 
University AA,AAAAAAAA  and the Guangming Daily published 
The charm of guoxue and the guoxue masters AAAAAAAAAA 
7AAAAAAAAAAA 0003 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA. 
http://www.huadingshuyuan.com/cn/news.php?show=detail&
news_id=1278 (accessed 12 January 2017).
8
 Among the most famous is the Chengxian Guoxue Institute A
AAAAAA in Peking, situated in the Guozijian AAA where, from the 
14th  to the late 19th century, officials took their civil service 
exams and where once again the pupils wear traditional robes 
and recite classical Confucian texts. Others include the Four 
Seas Confucius Academy AAAAAA  and the Peking University 
Academy of Erudition AAAAAAAA. 
more lessons on traditional culture to be added to the 
curriculum in both primary and secondary schools; by 
interesting coincidence, this occurred at about the same 
time as there was discussion in Beijing education circles 
about reducing the weight given to English in the high 
school curriculum.9.  Subsequently universities have also 
been admonished to reduce ‘foreign’ learning and those 
private schools which have a purportedly international 
focus have been instructed to Sinify their curricula. 
The advance of the Canon10 is also a repercussion of 
the idea, implicit in much discussion, that China’s 
successes of the last 30 years have come about as 
functions of Chinese culture rather than of learning from 
the West. 11  It is reasoned that when China adopted 
‘Western’ notions, ie Marxism, it failed to develop; once 
these were abandoned in the 1980s, China raced ahead.
If you look at the content of guoxue classes, at least 
at the primary level, you are first struck that they are 
about teaching manners, behaviour and the 
acknowledgment of interdependence. 12 This is the stuff 
9
 City of Beijing Education Committee (2013) 
Framework Plan for the Secondary School
Leaving Examination AAAAAAAAAAA2014-2016 AAAAAAA
AAAAA
http://edu.people.com.cn/n/2015/0601/c244541-
27084479.html (accessed 19 December 2017)
10
 To bring the older generation up to speed, universities 
and private colleges have also set up such classes. 
Tsinghua, my own university, has a Guoxue Department 
(see http://www.tacl.tsinghua.edu.cn).
11
 Perkins DH. (2000) Law, family ties and the East Asian 
way of business. In: Harrison LE, Huntington SP. (eds.) 
Culture matters: how values shape human progress. New 
York: Basic Books. See also Berger Peter L. and Hsiao 
Hsin-Huang Michael (eds.), (1988) In Search of an East 
Asian Development Model New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Transaction Books. Tai Hung-chao, (ed.) (1989) 
Confucianism and Economic Development: An Oriental 
Alternative? Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute 
Press. Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research 
(1989) Conference on Confucianism and Economic 
Development in East Asia Taipei: CIER Press. Vogel, 
Ezra F. (1991) The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of 
Industrialization in East Asia Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. Jochim, Christian (1992) Confucius 
and Capitalism: Views of Confucianism in Works on 
Confucianism and Economic Development. In: Journal 
of Chinese Religions, no. 20.   
12
 Peking University Blue Bird Junior Schools textbooks. These 
are complemented by prettily produced versions of the great 
children’s classics, Rules for Siblings A A A AThe Analects of 
Confucius AA, The Three Character Classic AAA. As in the past, 
young children recite them. When asked how much the children 
can actually understand, the response from the teachers is that 
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of childrens’ rhyming classics such as the ‘Three 
Ideogram Classic’ and the ‘Rules for Pupil and Child’ 
which are again widely used, but they are also reflected 
in newly produced childrens’ schoolbooks. Teachers and 
parents both say that moral education is a priority, that it 
is the fundamental basis, that the child must learn to be a 
good, cooperative and therefore moral member of society 
before anything else. The individualism and 
competitiveness that is so much prized in Anglosphere 
schools are not admired; to the contrary, the child is to 
see him or herself as in what Burke, in another age and 
place, famously described as ‘a partnership . . . not only 
between those who are living, but between those who are 
living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born’. 
Public exhortation
Chinese authorities have long regarded moral 
exhortation as among their most important duties and 
admonitions abound in China, on walls, hanging from 
cranes or on park railings. Under the Communist Party, 
and until recently, they have been very political ( ‘Raise 
high the banner of Socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’), but there has been a gradual 
metamorphosis from red to homely, with calls to be a 
considerate grandchild or to contribute more to the 
harmony of society (‘the country and you should treat 
each other with a mother’s profound affection’).
These are put up by local government; but even 
nationally-inspired slogans, pointing out the  ‘key values 
of Socialism’ on stickers, in parks and shopping centres, 
on street hoardings, are light years away from Marx or 
Mao: Affluence and Strength, DemocracyA  CivilityA
HarmonyA FreedomA EqualityA JusticeA LegalityA
PatriotismAProfessionalismASincerityAKindness. These 
are often accompanied by pretty pictures of jolly families 
of three generations.
The latest trend has been to cite traditional Chinese 
philosophers, including Confucius and Mencius. 13  
Among the precepts presented in conventional 
propaganda mode, are:
• Should you not know the conventions, you 
cannot establish yourself
• Cultivate and discipline your moral life, admire 
virtue and incline to what is good, be modest and 
considerate of others.
understanding of the classics varies from age to age; the young 
child will have a limited comprehension but when she matures 
much more will grasped and, later, the adult will be able to draw 
on the full wisdom of the classics once experience of life and 
study has readied her. This approach to learning helps train the 
memory and concentration.
13
 More on this in de Burgh and Feng (in press). The Return of 
the Repressed: three examples of how Chinese identity is being 
reconsolidated for the modern world to be published in Critical 
Arts: South-North Cultural and Media Studies.
Thus the young Chinese citizen is left in no doubt as 
to where she or he is to find inspiration.
Officialdom
2017 has seen the screening of a gripping drama, In 
the Name of the People, about a police investigative team 
uncovering a network of corruption that connects mayors, 
deputy provincial governors and even a minister beside 
the throne. The fact that the Propaganda Department and 
the regulator have approved this series (it was first spiked 
in Jiangsu, where it was made, but Hunan TV took it on) 
indicates the confidence now felt in the system. Flaws 
and faults can with equanimity be exposed for discussion, 
they will not provoke revolution, since the investigators 
are so obviously imbued with a profound sense of 
responsibility with which every upright citizen can 
identify. In this drama, the particular forms of corruption 
to which China is inclined are scrutinised unrelentingly. 
Neverthless the system itself is legitimate because, in 
essence, it is in accord with tradition, though infused with 
a sense of public service replacing loyalty to an Emperor.
In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping re-established the civil 
service as a body recruited on merit and, countless 
changes later, China’s managers are in principle well 
educated, selected by examination, promoted through a 
triangulating system and constantly refreshed and 
retrained. 
It is for these officials that President Xi has devoted 
considerable effort to adumbrating his moral vision, 
reviving the Confucian ethic of governance. When 
addressing meetings of civil service and Party personnel, 
he repeats saws which almost always hark back to the 
past, as in this quotation from around 1000BC: 
‘Government officials who are good at governing a 
country will treat the people like parents caring for their 
children……….Hearing that the people are suffering 
from hunger and cold[], they will grieve; seeing that the 
people are working too hard, they will be in pain.’  
(Zhang, 2015, p32)
If paternalism is the first principle of Confucian 
government, then the moral character of the ruler and his 
assistants is the second. Thus the wise ruler is given to 
self examination and Xi exhorts as much from his 
acolytes, in this quotation from the Three Ideogram 
Classic:
‘The jade that is not fashioned does not become a 
jewel, nor yet does the unlearnt man become one of 
stature.’ (Zhang, 2015 p181)
Officials have a higher cause and must steel 
themselves in order to execute it. This means constant 
vigilance against  corruption and sloth if they are not to 
forfeit the trust of the people. It means cultivating 
yourself to ‘be a civilized person’. 14
14
 The Chinese term is zuoren. To translate zuoren literally as 
‘to be a man’ gives quite the wrong connotation as ‘be a man’ 
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No longer is the official class expected to repeat the 
Marxist Leninist rosary that the CCP learnt from the 
Russians 80 odd years ago. Frank Pieke has examined the 
education and training of current cadres and found that 
the content is mostly what an MBA candidate might get 
from any good business school. There is a theory module 
too, but theory does not mean Marxist exegesis but 
understanding the meaning of the Three Represents, the 
Harmonious Society and China Dream. For hearts that 
hanker for a spiritual dimension there is Red History with 
which trainees are taught to revere the mighty work of 
the Party in driving out the exploiters and the foreigners. 
Red History has its saints – Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai of 
course. Red Tourism, or outings to sacred places of the 
Party insurgency, inspires further devotion. (Pieke, 2009,  
pp89 et seq)
In this formulation, the early CCP was a band of 
patriotic heroes. Missing from its genesis are not only 
Marxist theory but the Russian midwife; the disasters of 
the first 30 years of government have given way to a story 
of continuity. 15 China’s renaissance is coming about 
because that heroic band created a Party which would be, 
and still is, the spine of modern China and the guarantor 
of the continuity of its great civilization. As President Xi 
puts it: ‘without compass and setsquare, no one could 
form circles and squares’. (Zhang, 2015, p26)
Populism 
In his recent book analysing a great divide in 
Western politics, David Goodhart finds that a gulf has 
grown up between the ‘somewheres’ who believe that 
their countries’ essence and their own interests are under 
threat from cultural, economic and political globalisation 
and the ‘anywheres’ who feel no attachment to the nation 
but are universalists looking forward to the victory of a 
transnational ideology. He notes that this divide has in 
various ways emerged in many different societies and 
that populists have emerged to represent the oppressed 
‘somewheres’, from Erogan to Le Pen, Farage to Tsipras. 
President Xi appears to be speaking to similar hopes and 
fears; in other words his behaviour is not merely an 
in English has echoes of butch footballers or action films. ‘A 
man’ in this Chinese sense is certainly not a testosterone fuelled 
commando but a self disciplined, considerate and reflecting 
adult of either sex. 
15
 Brady likens the Party to the medieval Roman Catholic 
Church and Zheng Yongyuan sees Party rule as a modern 
dynasty. Pieke refers to it as the superego of governance and its 
pivot, the Zhongnanhai leadership compound, as the ‘Sacred 
Void’. By the latter he appears to mean much of that which 
Bagehot meant when he characterised the British monarchy of 
the age of empire: ‘Its mystery is its life. We must not let in 
daylight upon magic. We must not bring the Queen into the 
combat of politics, or she will cease to be reverenced by all 
combatants.’  Pieke identifies the mystery of the core leadership 
as its great strength. 
acknowledgement that the Chinese people have rejected 
the ideology imposed upon them after 1949, but reflects 
too a populist repudiation of the obvious alternatives, in 
particular ‘universalism’, the post-Marxist ideology of 
Western political elites.
It is not just philosophical maxims or calligraphy 
that are to be defended, but a way of looking at the world 
and seeing yourself in it. That China has a culture that is 
distinct from that of the Anglo-Saxons is not just an 
intellectuals’ conceit, but a popular conviction. Geert 
Hofstede16 defines culture as the collective programming 
of the mind, which distinguishes the members of one 
group from another, and he proposes four cultural 
dimensions. Chinese and Anglophones are at opposite 
ends of those dimensions and help explain why the 
paternalist, authoritarian and communitarian aspects of 
Chinese society that cause Western liberals such angst 
are legitimate in much of China and seen as preferable to 
the ‘other’. An understanding of this difference, once 
confined to anthroplogists and social psychologists, is 
now routine in China among students, media pundits and 
talk show participants. Indeed it is standard fare for 
Marketing Studies, too, suggesting that it does indeed 
have real-world use! 
The current TV drama of 48 episodes, Good 
Husbands, tells of the crises and confrontations within an 
ordinary family as one daughter seeks to marry and the 
other to divorce, both against the parents’ wishes. 
Although modernity, here reflected in the economic 
independence of women, the gap between the generations 
and consumerism, is shown to have put a strain on the 
Confucian family, ultimately everybody wants to hold to 
it and seeks to adapt modern life to the Confucian ideal. 
17
According to Harvard’s Li Jin, it is still the case that 
how a person fulfills the role assigned within a network 
or community is more important than the expression of 
individual personality. Building on the pioneer 
sociologist Fei Hsiao-tong, she emphasizes how in 
Chinese society individual humanity is defined by 
relationships and their moral significance (Li, 2012, p37). 
The ‘little platoon’ embraces as much as it restricts and 
few want to leave it.
Chinese enjoy many freedoms that their 
grandparents lost and have more rights than people in 
16
 Hofstede, Geert (2001) Culture’s Consequences: comparing 
values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across 
nations Thousand Oaks: Sage. Hofstde is only the writer who 
presents these ideas particularly clearly. Others who have shed 
light on the cultural dynamics include Chiu, Chi-yue and Hong, 
Ying-yi (2006) Social Psychology of Culture. New York: 
Psychology Press.
17
 The 2015 family drama Good Husbands 丈丈丈(Anhui/LeTV) 
tells the story of two sisters and their relationships with their 
father and husbands, representing the women as assertive, 
dynamic and enterprising.
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many other countries, as the government points out when 
criticised. But these rights are trumped by duties, not only 
in the family but the wider community. Leaders of 
commerce, entrepreneurs, the job creators are certainly 
admired and they may flaunt their wealth. Yet, in 
Confucian eyes, their successes come about because of 
the support of the community from which they come and, 
ultimately, their wealth belongs to the community which 
enabled them to become what they are. 
Astonished at the contingency of commercial power, 
Oxford’s Stein Ringen remarks, ‘the socialist market 
economy is like no other economy. China is different’. 
(Ringen, 2016, p18) Abjuring Google, Twitter or 
Facebook and creating a Chinese cybersphere is as much 
about defending the Chinese order as it is about halting 
the power of transnational capital. 
China is also unapologetic about its political system, 
and when people talk of democracy they are not 
necessarily talking about adopting Anglophone electoral 
democracy. (deBurgh, 2006, p26) This apparent 
contentment with authoritarianism can make 
Anglophones nervous.
But should it?
For when Anglophones think of a country led by an 
authoritarian ruler articulating a unifying ideology, they 
tend to assume that this will be aggressive. It would be 
wrong to jump to such a conclusion because what 
President Xi advances is a restoration rather than a 
crusade. The idea of a ‘true faith’ which it is a duty to 
proselytize to the benighted is rather to be associated with 
monotheist societies. Now that China has sidelined 
aspects of Marxism, in particular its search for paradise 
and belief in universal truth, it has reverted to the 
complacent Confucian idea that China is the shining light 
upon a hill which will attract the world. This may be  
quite difficult for Westerners to take in.
In Western understanding of the last century, the 
United States, backed by some Europeans, saved the 
world from evil ideologies and promoted a bundle of 
institutions which we term ‘democratic’ and which, we 
sometimes remember, largely derive from England – rule 
of law, distribution of power, balance of estates, 
accountability through elections, free media. 
It is a wonderful story, and those who were 
victims of universalist ideologies in the 20th century 
can be as enthusiastic for it as are the Anglophones 
themselves. Perhaps because it is such a great story, 
Anglophones are mostly blind to the fact that we 
have turned it into a missionary doctrine, to which 
much of the political class subscribes: That they have 
the right and duty to subvert those who offend their 
universalist assumptions, in domestic life certainly 
but in international affairs too. 
By comparison, what President Xi is consolidating 
is much less militant. It is true that many Chinese are very 
sensitive to threats to the integrity of the country. The 
territories of the Qing Empire which the British, Russians 
and Japanese sought to dismember have, in the minds of 
many Chinese, become the inviolable homeland. Yet 
wanting to right the wrongs of the 19th and early 20th 
century, to diminish the American encirclement and to 
restore China’s predominant position in East Asia is not 
the same as aggressive militarism. 18
Xi is at pains to show that Chinese assertiveness is 
different. He declares that China will be an example to 
others over the environment, international trade, non-
interference, contribution to UN peacekeeping and, most 
remarkably, in its transnational development programme, 
the One Belt One Road Initiative. The initiative will bind 
much of Asia to China through infrastructure on land and 
seapower on the oceans. China is to be leader and 
paradigm. But he goes out of the way to warn other 
countries to take their own paths and not copy China. 
(Ringen, 2016)
Chinese inclusiveness is what Xi promotes, not a 
universal truth to be foisted on others, and he insinuates 
that this contrasts with the West’s evangelism. At the 
College d’Europe in 2014, he spoke of his belief that 
China should not copy the political institutions or 
development model of other countries and that all should 
respect difference. He said:
‘A tasty orange, grown in southern China, would 
turn sour once it is grown in the north. The leaves may 
look the same, but the fruits taste quite different, because 
the north means different location and different climate.’ 
(Xi, 2014b)
Soon after, he emphasised his point by reminding the 
Europeans of their own diversity, and suggesting that 
respect for diversity should be a principle of relations all 
over the world. 
The refounding myth and a new world order
Sceptics dismiss the myths by which nations live as 
so much invention and mumbo jumbo. Yet politicians 
who started with the desire to destroy inherited culture – 
Stalin and Hitler come to mind – found they had to co-
opt it in order to mobilise their subjects, so powerful were 
those myths. In recent times the universalists have had 
setbacks in Europe and the USA as the myths have 
refused to fade away. Something similar is going on in 
China, where the rulers have grasped that their people too 
‘want the country back’. On the street, Marxist 
universalism and religiosity have given way to a 
18
 French and Allison go into greater detail but in essence come 
to the same conclusion. See French, Howard 
W. 2017 Everything under the Heavens: How the Past Helps 
Shape China’s Push for Global Power New York: Knopf and 
Allison, Graham (2017) Destined for War: Can America and 
China Escape Tucydides’ Trap? Dublin: Houghton Mifflin 
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pragmatic consensus of revived Confucianism. Moral 
leaders are replacing historical determinism and the cult 
of progress with the requirement to live up to the highest 
standards of forbears. People refuse to see themselves as 
atomised equals related only to the state or the Great 
Helmsman but realise themselves through their social 
roles as family and community members. 
What President Xi and his advisers appear to be 
doing is turning a popular emotion into a state ideology. 
The ideology is to give direction and purpose to both 
government and governed. It is an equivalent of the 
idealism that propelled the rise of the USA, or the sacred 
duty that sanctified late British imperialism, but there is 
no messianic faith with dangerous implications for 
outsiders. It is, though, similar in stressing its uniqueness. 
Says President Xi:
‘Several thousand years ago, the Chinese people trod 
a path that was different from other nations’. (Tatlow, 
2014, p2) ‘We should carry forward and foster the 
traditional virtues long cultivated and developed by our 
ancestors’.  (Xi, 2014a)
Anglophones may not approve of the authoritarian 
and hierarchical assumptions, the putting of duties before 
rights, the sense of superiority, but we should be grateful 
that China is not evangelising or imperialist. President Xi 
Jinping is consolidating a revived Chinese identity which 
reflects popular instincts. It is a vision of China that he 
now has the power to project everywhere.
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